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In order to establish a competitive advantage, firms must acquire or create resources at a price
below their value in use. Absent pure luck, this requires managers to exercise foresight about
a resource’s future value and/or complementarities with pre-existing capabilities. This foresight
grants managers the opportunity to exploit information asymmetries for personal gain as well
as building organizational capabilities. Nevertheless, there is limited research on the extent of
foresight or how managers use it. In our study of insider trading, we found that managers
purchase stock well before breakthrough patents are filed. We argue for further research on the
extent of managerial foresight and how it affects rent generation and appropriation. Copyright
 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Follow the Patents? That’s what one research
boutique is doing—and its work suggests that
investors should pay close attention to compa-
nies’ patent activity . . . At the core of CHI’s
system is something it calls ‘citation impact’.
(Robert Barker, BusinessWeek, 11 March 2002)
A central question raised in theories of compet-
itive advantage is how firms acquire and/or cre-
ate strategic resources for less than their value in
use. Barney (1986) offers two explanations: firms
have unique expectations about a new resource’s
value or luck (e.g., the asset’s value is not antici-
pated). Unique expectations, in turn, stem from pri-
vate information or idiosyncratic complementary
assets that firms accumulate over time (Barney,
1989; Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Whether strategic
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assets are acquired directly or accumulated gradu-
ally, there is an implicit assumption that managers
play a key role in developing capabilities. Gen-
erally, this foresight precedes rent generation as
it takes time to put new resources into produc-
tive use. Thus, resource-based competitive advan-
tages hinge on managers’ ability to identify and
accumulate strategic assets over time (Amit and
Schoemaker, 1993).
This study highlights two assumptions underly-
ing the resource-based view: (1) managers possess
some degree of strategic foresight; and (2) strategic
foresight is used for the benefit of the firm. We
argue and subsequently demonstrate that when
managers have foreknowledge about strategic
assets they may try to use it for personal gain by
engaging in insider trading. This does not chal-
lenge the second assumption so much as it suggests
that managers may use their knowledge in multiple
ways. While foresight may be necessary for rent
generation, it does not necessarily imply that such
rents will flow, in their entirety, to shareholders.
In demonstrating this, we also provide empirical
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evidence on the extent and quality of managerial
foresight.
We explore managerial foresight in the context
of breakthrough patents: those with a high ‘citation
impact,’ an indication that a firm may have devel-
oped strategic assets. We argue that the patent pro-
cess resembles Dierickx and Cool’s (1989) asset
accumulation model. For that reason, such patents
are viewed as signals of future economic per-
formance (see the quotation above). In addition,
patents may serve as isolating mechanisms to keep
technologies from rivals or allow firms to cap-
ture rents through licensing (Lippman and Rumelt,
1982; Teece, 1986). While patents overtly reflect
codified knowledge, they also represent underlying
tacit and complex knowledge critical to subsequent
innovations or to commercialization (Long, 2002).
Thus, implicit capabilities indicated by key patents
may also be inimitable due to tacitness, causal
ambiguity, or social complexity (Barney, 1991).
Information about breakthrough patents materi-
alizes at different times to different stakeholders.
In the early stages of R&D, knowledge is tacit
and hard to convey, even within the firm (Nonaka,
1994). In preparing a patent application, some of
the knowledge becomes codified and its potential
becomes clearer. However, even when such knowl-
edge is codified and the patent application is filed,
information about the breakthrough may be kept
in confidence until the patent is granted. Hence,
information asymmetries between managers and
investors (as well as rivals) may persist well after
knowledge is codified in a patent application.
Empirically, we examine whether managers have
the foresight to identify key patents ex ante as
reflected in insider trading patterns. The follow-
ing sections explore how information asymmetries
arising from knowledge creation may influence
insider trading. The proposed hypotheses are tested




The core question for strategy researchers is why
some firms outperform others (Rumelt, Schendel,
and Teece, 1991). For example, the resource-based
view focuses internally on advantages conferred
by unique inimitable resources. This theory has
important implications for managerial foresight
about the emergence of an advantage and for the
ability of managers to exploit this foreknowledge.
Competitive advantage and foresight
Managerial foresight is the ability to predict how
managers’ actions can create a competitive advan-
tage. As such, it plays a critical role in all major
theories of competitive advantage; each of these
theories implicitly assumes that managers have
some degree of foresight about the emergence
of an advantage. Absent foresight, these theories
would, in practice, be indistinguishable from luck.
Thus, if managers play a systematic role in the
emergence of an advantage they must have fore-
sight about what actions are likely to lead to an
advantage.
In the case of the resource-based view, advan-
tages either emerge through strategic factor mar-
kets (Barney, 1986) or the accumulation of idiosyn-
cratic resources over time (Dierickx and Cool,
1989). Setting aside luck-based explanations, it
is clear that managers must have some foresight
that their actions may create an advantage. Bar-
ney argues that having ‘more accurate’ information
about the value of a resource enables managers
to acquire resources at a price below their ulti-
mate value in use—assuming rival bidders lack
access to the private information (Barney, 1986:
1235–1236). For example, knowing that IBM was
seeking an operating system in 1981 for their new
personal computer, Bill Gates acquired a CP/M
clone called 86-DOS for a mere $50,000—the rest
is Windows history (Miller, 2001). If Seattle Com-
puter, the original owner of DOS, had understood
the potential, the selling price would have more
accurately reflected the ultimate value of the asset
and Gates would not have realized as much of the
rent.
Similarly, Dierickx and Cool (1989) argue that
firms acquire relatively generic resources in spot
markets but that these are integrated and exposed
to the firm’s idiosyncratic routines. Over time,
this path-dependent process of resource accumula-
tion produces unique capabilities that rivals, who
have distinct path dependencies of their own, can-
not easily imitate or replicate. Managers have
a responsibility to oversee resource acquisition
and integration and guide the development of the
routines that transform the resources. Absent an
active managerial role, this process would also be
reduced to luck.
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While managers’ choices may be constrained
by existing path dependencies, they do play a
key role in resource acquisition decisions and
in developing idiosyncratic routines. Managers
must make decisions that maximize the likeli-
hood of creating a valuable capability that con-
fers a competitive advantage. We liken this to
the development of an R&D capability, which
typically begins with the acquisition of scien-
tific expertise. Over time, interactions on the
research team produce a critical mass on certain
types of innovations, and managers seek addi-
tional expertise that complements existing knowl-
edge and deepens the capability. In this way, as
the endeavor begins to bear fruit, the resource
accumulation process might become more directed
and deliberate. Despite the role of path depen-
dencies, managers are generally active in build-
ing such a capability long before its fruits are
known outside of the firm (note again that we
have set aside luck-based explanations for resource
acquisition).
Indeed, the distinction between the two appro-
aches is not as stark as the debate might sug-
gest—they are more complements than substi-
tutes. Barney (1989) emphasized that Dierickx and
Cool’s (1989) asset accumulation scenario is an
important source of information asymmetry in
strategic factor markets. This is why he origi-
nally concluded that firms should ‘look within’ for
sources of competitive advantage (Barney, 1986).
Consider, for example, Monsanto’s bold move into
biotechnology. They began by establishing a ven-
ture capital firm to target investments in biotech-
nology startups. They followed this with acqui-
sitions, joint ventures, alliances, and building an
internal R&D capability. Barney (1988) argued
that acquisitions can be considered a form of strate-
gic factor market. Venture capital, joint ventures,
and alliances are mixtures of internal development
and quasi-market mechanisms. They certainly did
not acquire purely generic resources that only
became specialized and valuable upon integration
with the firm’s other assets. Ultimately, Monsanto
became a biotechnology company and spun off its
core chemicals business under a separate name.
As this example illustrates, while the capability
was created using a mixture of internal and exter-
nal transactions, managers clearly had a specific
intent or foresight about what kind of company
they sought to create.
How much foresight do managers have?
Of course, none of this discussion implies that
managers are always right in the strategies they
choose or in their assessments of what will cre-
ate value. In general, managers make such deci-
sions under great uncertainty and it is unreason-
able to presume that anyone can be certain that a
given strategy will produce a competitive advan-
tage ex ante. However, it is equally unreasonable
to assume that managers operate under conditions
of total uncertainty and have no idea whether their
strategies will be successful. This position would
relegate all competitive advantage to the realm of
luck since no systematic or intended strategy could
yield an advantage. Indeed, one might argue that
under such conditions the entire field of strate-
gic management would have little potential to add
value. Accordingly, the question of how much
foresight managers actually have seems to be fairly
important for the strategic management literature.
With few exceptions (Durand, 2003), there has
been little research exploring how much fore-
sight managers have and how managers might use
that foresight for personal gain.1 In the case of a
knowledge-based advantage, managers may own
or control the primary rent-generating resources.2
Hence, managers may enjoy a strong position from
which to appropriate rent (Castanias and Helfat,
1992; Coff, 1999). In contrast, shareholders gener-
ally bring the most fungible of all resources to the
table. This may grant managers tremendous power
in terms of their ability to influence and manage
the rent distribution process. However, the extent
of this power depends on the amount of managerial
foresight deployed to generate the advantage.
Can managers reap gains through insider
trading?
Foresight, in turn, may translate to information
asymmetries. In general, the information
1 The agency theory literature certainly assumes that individu-
als act in their own self-interest and that this may conflict with
shareholder objectives. However, the agency literature addresses
primarily a stable or even shrinking pie as opportunistic man-
agers plunder the firm and send it into a spiral of declining
performance. This context differs markedly from the emergence
of a competitive advantage—our focus in this article.
2 Professional firms rely on similar types of assets which are
recognized to promote partnerships, as opposed to the corporate
form in which ownership and control are separated (Milgrom and
Roberts, 1992). It seems reasonable that similar issues may arise
frequently from the knowledge assets at the core of a resource-
based advantage.
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asymmetries between investors and managers
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) tend to be ampli-
fied in the case of knowledge-based advantages
because knowledge may be difficult to transfer
across organizational boundaries (Kogut and Zan-
der, 1992). Furthermore, the market has better
information about a firm’s physical assets than its
intangible assets from which to assess the firm’s
prospects. One might argue that investors face a
much harder task in assessing the market value
of knowledge-creating firms. We need only look
at the wildly fluctuating market values of biotech-
nology or ‘dot com’ firms to see the impact of
complex knowledge-based assets on shareholder
wealth (Lee, 2001).
Knowledge-intensive firms may therefore cre-
ate settings that allow managers to exploit infor-
mation asymmetries through insider trading. Note
that the buying and selling of a firm’s stock by
managers and officers is typically routine and
is rarely the focus of SEC enforcement activi-
ties. Evidence related to insider trading is consis-
tent with managers taking advantage of the infor-
mation asymmetry between insiders and outside
investors (John and Lang, 1991; Karpoff and Lee,
1991; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Seyhun, 1992) In
fact, Ke, Huddart, and Petroni (2003) find that
insider trades are consistent with foreknowledge
of future earnings, as early as 2 years prior to
the earnings announcements. In R&D-intensive
firms the degree of asymmetry is amplified, which
may lead to more opportunistic behavior (Coff,
2003). Furthermore, investors seem to assume that
managerial trading in R&D-intensive firms is an
especially critical signal of the firms’ prospects
(Coff and Lee, 2003). Thus, insider trading may
play an important role in the rent appropriation
process.3
3 Regulation is the primary deterrent to insider trading. Managers
must notify the SEC of transactions in a given month within
10 days after the end of the month. Trades are scrutinized to
see if they were motivated by information about ‘significant,
confidential corporate developments’ (Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2002). In practice, enforcement focuses on trading
driven by specific short-term events rather than longer-term
impressions of a given strategic direction or R&D effort. Stock
prices do not reflect the implications of the insider trading until
transactions become public knowledge—up to 40 days after the
trade is executed. Thus, management can purchase shares at an
unadjusted price and sell the shares after investors have bid up
the price to reflect managers’ optimism.
Patent activity as a source of information
asymmetries
Managers have access to knowledge of important
strategic events, like impending mergers or tech-
nological breakthroughs that may affect the value
of the firm. Patents can be an important repre-
sentation of imminent technological breakthroughs
that reflect platforms upon which future innova-
tions will be based (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001).
In effect, patents reflect a capability-building pro-
cess not unlike that described by Dierickx and
Cool (1989). Specifically, highly cited patents are
indicative of the path-dependent asset accumula-
tion process because subsequent patents clearly
build upon the initial breakthrough. Again, unless
complementary assets accumulate without man-
agerial involvement, the process relies on manage-
rial foresight.
Furthermore, firms that want to protect their
intellectual property patent vigorously and often.
For example, Hewlett-Packard solidified its posi-
tion in the inkjet printer market by erecting a wall
of patents on their earliest breakthroughs. In this
case, the initial inkjet patents reflected technolo-
gies that were inferior to the dot matrix standard.
However, future patents built on (and cited) the ini-
tial technologies so that it emerged as the standard
for that market segment. The early patents effec-
tively blocked rivals from entering the inkjet mar-
ket without licensing Hewlett Packard’s technol-
ogy. Thus, in addition to blocking rivals, patents
may be valuable if they grant a firm bargaining
power in licensing agreements.
The knowledge creation process begins with
tacit knowledge such that the precise nature of
an innovation may not be clear (Nonaka, 1994;
Polanyi, 1962). At this stage, only the people
directly working on the innovation may under-
stand its full potential and even for them it may
involve a gut feeling rather than any sense of
certainty. At this point, knowledge of the break-
through may not be fully accessible to senior man-
agers or shareholders because it remains tacit or
complex (e.g., embedded in a highly technical lan-
guage/knowledge base).
As the knowledge process unfolds, the poten-
tial of an innovation becomes clearer and the firm
begins to identify elements that may be patentable.
The patent application process is long and bureau-
cratic. Once the firm identifies intellectual property
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it wishes to protect, it must develop an applica-
tion that cites all prior innovations on which the
intellectual property was based. The application
requires that the underlying technology be codi-
fied and that all possible uses of the technology
be specified.4 Upon submission, the application is
examined carefully to see if all relevant antecedent
patents are appropriately cited. The innovation
must also pass the ‘novelty and obviousness’ tests
to determine if the innovation is new and creative
(Hardy, 2002).
Generally, there is a considerable period in
which senior management has intimate knowledge
that: (1) there has been a scientific breakthrough,
(2) a patent has been applied for, and (3) the patent
may be an important building block for future
innovation. While a given patent may be stuck in
bureaucracy for years, management may have a
strong notion of its ultimate importance at the out-
set. The time between patent application and patent
granting is referred to as the patent pending period.
During the patent pending period, firms may pre-
fer to keep knowledge of the innovation private so
that rivals cannot imitate or reverse engineer the
breakthrough.5 In addition, if the information about
the innovation is public and/or has been used for
more than a year, it no longer meets the novelty
requirement for a patent. An ancillary analysis of
data compiled for the present study suggested that
public disclosure of breakthrough patents is rela-
tively rare. Indeed, 68 percent of the time there
was no public account of the patent at all and only
6 percent of the time did an account appear before
the patent was granted.
Even once a patent is granted, investors may
not know its full economic potential. First, it may
take time before an innovation actually appears
in the firm’s products. Even then, it may take
more time before the product’s performance can
be fully assessed in the marketplace (Ernst, 2001).
Finally, if a patent is a foundation for further
innovation, it may take years before subsequent
patents building upon its technology are applied
4 The patent office requires that ‘The specification shall contain
a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which
it pertains . . . to make and use the same’ (U.S. Patent Law, 1st
paragraph of 35 USC § 112).
5 The American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 requires that
information about pending patent applications be published, gen-
erally 18 months after an application has been filed. However,
this did not apply in the period studied.
for and granted. The investment strategy described
in our introductory quotation (at CHI research)
draws on patent citation data that may take years
to establish for a given patent (Barker, 2002).
Thus, senior managers may be aware of the
innovation for several years from developing the
technology, to preparing the patent application, to
waiting for the U.S. Patent Office to grant the
patent. During this period, there may be a wide
information gap between investors and managers
with respect to the innovation and the underly-
ing strategic capabilities. A number of studies
show that insiders can and do trade profitably on
inside information (Ke et al., 2003; Seyhun, 1986).
As such, it seems plausible that knowledge of
technological breakthroughs would trigger insider
trading.
Extent and nature of managerial foresight
about patent activity
Given the information asymmetries associated with
technological breakthroughs, managers may lay
the groundwork for rent appropriation long before
a patent has been announced. During that time,
managers may trade on their foresight or private
information that the firm is on the verge of a break-
through, thereby maximizing their own wealth
(Damodaran and Liu, 1993). If managers are able
to recognize that a particular patent or technology
has significant potential, they can personally real-
ize a significant gain by purchasing shares early
on. Thus, managers have opportunities to capitalize
on their foreknowledge about technological break-
throughs before a patent has even been filed.
However, since foresight is hard to observe
directly, we suggest that managers will exploit
information asymmetries through insider trading
when they have sufficient confidence that their
foresight is accurate. Thus, patterns of insider trad-
ing should reveal the extent and nature of the man-
agerial foresight associated with patenting break-
through innovations. This is much like Godfrey
and Hill’s (1995) suggestion for dealing with such
unmeasurables. Just as physicists measure vapor
trails to make inferences about nuclear physics, we
explore foresight by tracking observable behaviors
that would result from foresight. Thus, while we
are interested in the extent of managerial foresight
in differentiating between innovations, we observe
only the extent to which managers exploit such
foresight for personal gain. If managers do not
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fully exploit their foresight, our analysis would
tend to understate the actual extent of managerial
foreknowledge.
Foresight and patent activity as indicators of
economic value
We hypothesize that, for firms that patent, man-
agers’ trading activities are driven by their predic-
tions of the economic impact of patent activity.
However, this raises the question of what types of
patent activity managers base their trading. Each
year, firms manage a portfolio of innovation activi-
ties. For example, at any given time, some projects
may be in early stages such that the knowledge
is still tacit while others reflect codified knowl-
edge and patents that have been applied for. We
suggest that managers trade based on the progress
of the overall profile of activities in a given year
as well as focusing on specific breakthroughs that
may occur in that time frame.
There are many ways in which the economic
value of a portfolio of patent activities might be
assessed. For instance, is it more important to have
a flurry of small patents or one key patent that
will serve as a platform for future innovations?
What type of patent profile would give managers
confidence in the firm’s future performance?
Quantity of patents
While the number of patents is not a measure of
‘breakthrough innovations,’ the number of patents
may be an important indicator of potential suc-
cess—particularly in uncertain or fast-paced envi-
ronments. Indeed, the real options literature sug-
gests that in uncertain and dynamic environments
high-performing firms invest in many different
projects under the assumption that some will ulti-
mately lack promise and will not be brought to
market (McGrath, 1997). Using this logic, a large
number of patents might signal that the firm is well
positioned if only some of the innovations turn out
to be viable in the marketplace.
Thus, the number of patents might be viewed as
an indicator of a dynamic capability. Firms oper-
ating in volatile environments must continually
adjust (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). Where the
dynamism is driven by rapidly changing technol-
ogy, adjustments will require the ability to adapt
and develop technological innovations. Further-
more, since future needs may be hard to predict,
firms would need to develop and maintain differ-
ent technologies and knowledge bases in antici-
pation that they might turn out to be useful later
(Levinthal and March, 1993). This might manifest
itself in the quantity of novel ideas generated and
patented.
It is important to recognize that trading on the
number of patents implies a relatively low level of
foresight where managers cannot distinguish small
innovations that tend to have little economic value
from breakthroughs. They can, however, bet on
a general trajectory of innovative activity and the
likelihood that some projects may pan out even if
it is unclear which ones will prove to be of value.
Thus, even if managers lack the foresight to dis-
tinguish among innovations and identify individual
breakthroughs, we might expect:
Hypothesis 1: Insider purchases increase with
the number of patents applied for.
Patent importance
Managers may have stronger foreknowledge about
the importance of each patent that goes beyond the
sheer number of patents. Indeed, managers’ trading
activity may hinge more on the value of the most
promising innovation in their portfolio.
There are a variety of different factors that may
signal the quality or economic potential of a patent.
We offer three different indicators of patent impor-
tance, including the number of citations, the num-
ber of claims, and the time or lag between when a
breakthrough patent is granted and when it is cited.
The first measure, the citations a patent receives
in later patents, is commonly used (Trajtenberg,
1990). This measures the extent to which a given
innovation serves as a platform for subsequent
innovation. While this does not become apparent
externally for years after a patent is granted, man-
agers may have an idea of a patent’s potential even
before completing the patent application. If this
knowledge guides their trades, insider purchases
may serve as an early signal that the firm has a
new and promising technology platform.
Breakthrough patents may be reasonably good
indicators of underlying capabilities. While patents
are codified, the underlying knowledge required to
build on them tends to be more tacit in nature.
In the case of breakthrough patents, subsequent
efforts to build on the innovation were ultimately
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successful and the initial capability should be par-
ticularly valuable. Furthermore, the patent process
selects novel innovations and grants firms some
protection to keep the resource from rivals. In
short, breakthrough patents indicate that the firm
has valuable and rare resources that are unavailable
to rivals—the criteria for a strategic asset (Barney,
1991).
We use two measures of patent citations to
reflect breakthrough patents. The first is the num-
ber of citations received by the firm’s strongest
patent—the patent in the portfolio that, based on
citations, has the most potential. In this way, man-
agers may bet based on the ‘speed of their fastest
horse’ rather than the ‘number of horses they have
in the race’ (e.g., Hypothesis 1). Thus:
Hypothesis 2: Insider purchases increase with
the number of citations received by the firm’s
top patent.
The second indicator is the number of break-
through patents in a given year. First, even a firm’s
top patent may pale in comparison to other devel-
opments in the field—it may not represent a real
breakthrough. Some patents are essentially dead-
ends: inventions that have only a marginal value;
others serve to open up significant new technolog-
ical terrain. Such breakthrough patents are tremen-
dously valuable as foundations for firms to build
upon (Trajtenberg, 1990). Therefore, the number of
breakthroughs compares the firm’s top patents with
others in the field and accounts for the possibility
that a firm may have more than one breakthrough
patent. To the extent that managers can identify
breakthroughs early, they may be able to reap the
benefits of their foresight through stock purchases.
Put another way, managers may bet based on the
number of really fast horses they have in the race.
Accordingly:
Hypothesis 3: Insider purchases increase with
the number of breakthrough patents.
Another indicator of a patent’s economic value
is the number of claims made about what the
innovation will do. Thus, a patent on a technology
that may be used in a number of ways may be
more valuable than a patent that specifies a single
application or use. For example, if one is patenting
a chair, uses may include an object to sit on, an
object to step on to reach high places, an object
to display knick-knacks, etc. Applicants have an
incentive to list all possible uses since this defines
the scope of protection that the patent will provide.
In many cases the claims identify distinct market
needs that often suggest opportunities to leverage
a given innovation across markets or industries.
The ability to leverage a strategic resource in this
way is central to the notion of a core competence
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Therefore, it is not
surprising that the number of uses has been linked
to the commercial success of a patent (Lanjouw,
Pakes, and Putnam, 1998; Lanjouw and Schanker-
man, 1999) and may be one indicator that man-
agers respond to in assessing a patent’s impact on
firm performance. Thus:
Hypothesis 4: Insider purchases increase with
the number of claims associated with the firm’s
top patent.
A final way to test the nature of managerial fore-
sight is the extent to which trading is driven by
subsequent work that builds upon a patent. Our
previous hypotheses addressed this through mea-
sures of citation impact. However, citation impact
does not measure the speed with which a patent is
cited. Some patents have a more immediate impact.
Their arrival quickly spurs follow-up work. For
other patents, their importance may become visible
only after a significant lag.
Other things being equal, managers may be more
adept at identifying patents when the impact is
imminent. This is particularly true in the con-
text of causal ambiguity where subsequent inno-
vations may be harder to identify and predict
(Mosakowski, 1997; Reed and DeFillippi, 1990).
Further, managers may prefer to bet on technolo-
gies that are likely to yield immediate fruit given
the inherent uncertainty of the technology arena.
Accordingly, the shorter the lag before a patent
is cited, the more managers are likely to purchase
shares. Thus:
Hypothesis 5: Insider purchases decrease as the
length of time before the firm’s top patent is cited
increases.
Timing of foresight
The above hypotheses focus on different aspects
of patent activity. We now turn to the timing of
managerial foresight: when do managers act on
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their perceptions that patent activity will create
value? Again, since foresight cannot be easily
observed, we focus on the point at which managers
are sufficiently confident in the accuracy of their
foreknowledge that they use it in making personal
investment decisions. Since managers are aware
of patents before the actual filing and granting,
and investors may not know the economic impact
until well after the patent has been granted, the
period in which managers may purchase shares
in their firm is quite long. We can divide up
the time period into three ‘windows’ in which to
test for trading activity: the year before patents
are applied for (t − 1), the year in which patent
applications are filed (t), and the year after patents
have been applied for (t + 1). There is little reason
to focus on later periods because after the patent
is granted much of the relevant information about
the innovation should be public knowledge and the
opportunity to profit from information asymmetries
will have waned.
In each case, there would generally be infor-
mation asymmetries that managers could exploit.
However, if managers have strong foresight, the
opportunities to profit may be greater in the first
period when managers are developing a patent
application. This is the time period in which the
full potential of an innovation should first be
revealed to top managers since efforts are under
way to codify the knowledge and it should be more
fully understood. Put another way, there is less
new knowledge being revealed to top managers
in the later periods since much of the informa-
tion about the innovation is already codified, even
though such information may remain unavailable
to investors. Furthermore, the details of the inno-
vation may be released over time to the public,
reducing opportunities to profit in later periods. We
therefore predict that top managers will be most
likely to trade in the year before patent applica-
tions are filed (t − 1). Thus:
Hypothesis 6a: Insider purchases will increase
with patent activity in the year before a patent
is applied for (e.g., year t − 1 ).
There are several alternatives to this hypothesis
since information asymmetries with investors per-
sist well beyond this point. However, these would
suggest lower levels of foresight since managers
would apparently lack sufficient confidence in their
foreknowledge to use it to seek personal gain in
earlier periods. For example, it may be that top
managers only become aware of the true impor-
tance of patents at the time that patent applica-
tions are filed (e.g., a lag as the information trav-
els in the management hierarchy). This implies
that top managers are out of the loop or other-
wise uninvolved in R&D investment decisions and
technology development until its fruits are quite
apparent.
While one might expect managers to understand
the importance of an innovation once much of the
knowledge is codified, it is possible that follow-
on innovations and early market signals coincide
more with the later periods (e.g., the period when
the patent is pending but has not yet been granted).
For example, it may be that top management
enthusiasm peaks when subsequent innovations
are developed and/or they have results from early
market tests of the innovation. In this case, top
managers may be more likely to trade on their
private knowledge when the patent application is
filed or even after the application is under review.
Therefore, we present the following alternative
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 6b: Insider purchases will increase
with patent activity in the year that a patent is
applied for (e.g., year t).
Hypothesis 6c: Insider purchases will increase
with patent activity in the year after a patent is
applied for (e.g., year t + 1 ).
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Sample and data
The sample includes all firms that (1) are publicly
traded and (2) received approval for at least one
patent that was applied for between 1988 and
1990.6 Insider trading data are available for firms
that are publicly traded and we are only interested
in those firms that sought patent protection for
innovations (in order to assess whether the quality
or quantity of patents affects trading activity). Data
on 285,465 patents were originally taken from the
U.S. Patent Office (USPTO) and initially cleaned
6 These years have been chosen because we need information
on subsequent patent importance, a measure that requires a
substantial follow-up period.
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by Hall and others (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg,
2001). Because the USPTO does not accurately
attribute patents to firms using unique identifiers,
it is necessary to link the patents to the firms
manually. For example, patents for IBM might
be entered as ‘IBM Corp.,’ ‘IBM, Inc.,’ or ‘Inter-
national Business Machines,’ among other possi-
ble names. These linkages have been clarified for
large COMPUSTAT firms. We augmented this by
coding the data for smaller publicly traded firms.
In this way, our sample better represents actual
patent activity. Of the 285,465 patents, 101,963
were identified as attributable to 3300 firms that
were publicly traded at some point. However, not
all of the firms were publicly traded during the
period studied and many could not be matched to
other data sources. Ultimately, the sample included
1269 firms that were matched with COMPUSTAT,
CRSP, and Thompson Financial’s insider trading
database.
Our analysis is based on patents that were
applied for and ultimately granted because, dur-
ing the period studied, there was no informa-
tion available publicly on failed applications. This
same limitation applies to nearly all research
that draws on U.S. patent data. Published statis-
tics suggest that approximately 75 percent of all
patent applications are ultimately granted (U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, 2002). However,
sources at the USPTO indicated that, for our sam-
ple, the success rate is probably quite close to
100 percent because: (1) organizations have higher
patent granting rates than individuals; (2) domestic
applicants have higher patent granting rates than
foreign applicants; and (3) corporations often refile
or amend patents even if an initial attempt fails
(U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 2003). To ver-
ify this, we explored some key corporate success
rates during the period after 2001 when patent
applications were made public. Of the patents
applied for in January of 2001, Intel, Toshiba,
GE, and Kodak had 100 percent of their patents
granted 24 months later. In the same period, IBM
had 83 percent, Xerox had 71 percent, Motorola
had 66 percent, and 3M had 61 percent granted.
These rates would be higher if calculated over a
longer period since 24 months is the average patent
pending period and many take considerably longer.
As such, we do not anticipate that the restriction
to patents that have ultimately been granted intro-
duces any systematic bias.
Time periods
Our hypotheses involve testing the impact of patent
applications in several periods. We began by iden-
tifying the ‘top’ patent for each firm during the
3-year time frame studied using the patent perfor-
mance measures described earlier.7 We defined a
firm’s ‘top’ patent as that which was mostly heav-
ily cited, had the most claims, and for which sub-
sequent work was under way soonest (e.g., patent
was cited quickly). Using these criteria, there was
a single patent that appeared strongest for nearly
all the firms. For the few firms (14) that had mul-
tiple top patents, we selected the earlier patent
but tested whether these observations influenced
the results. Of course, we also control for this by
using the number of breakthrough patents to test
Hypothesis 3.
Once a top patent was identified for each firm,
the time periods were constructed around the
patent application dates. The first and earliest
period ran from 18 months before the applica-
tion date to 6 months before the application date.
The second period represented the year in which
the patent application was filed (6 months before
and after the application date). Finally, the third
and latest period ran from 6 months after the
patent was filed to 18 months after the patent
was filed. A relatively high degree of foresight
would exist if managers trade on knowledge of top
patents in the first period (before the application is
filed)—especially when compared to trading in the
third period when the patent has been pending for
some time.
Dependent variable
Our dependent variable is the natural log of the
value of shares purchased on the open market
by all insiders (Stock purchases) in a given year.
Specifically, this is the number of shares purchased
multiplied by the average purchase price for all
insider purchases in a given year. Following Sey-
hun (1990), we set aside other transactions such
7 We selected each firm’s top patent because we wished to
test whether managers viewed it as an important event as
evidenced by their trading patterns. However, there remains
a great deal of variation in patent quality—not every firm
generates breakthroughs. Indeed, most patents are mundane and
their economic value is somewhat suspect. The range of top
patents for firms in the sample is quite wide: citations received
ranges from 1 to 311; claims ranges from 1 to 868; and the
forward lag ranges from 0 to 10 years.
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as the exercise of options and shares acquired
from compensation plans, since the timing and
amount of these transactions may not reflect man-
agement’s private information so much as the
structure of the compensation system. Insider trad-
ing data come from Thompson Financial Corpora-
tion’s database, which covers all insider trading
activity reported to the SEC: 187,018 insider trad-
ing events in 11,174 firms between 1985 and 1992.
Information about these trades is released in bun-
dles as they are reported to the SEC monthly.
Thus, an event may include several trades from a
given manager along with trades from other man-
agers. The dollar value of the shares purchased is
log-transformed because of the skewed nature of
the variable especially when comparing large and
small firms.
Independent variables
We use several independent variables drawn from
the patent data to measure the quality and quantity
of patent activity in a given year. First, we use
the number of patents (#Patents) applied for to
test whether the number of patents in a given year
influences insider trading (Hypothesis 1).
Patent citations received (Cites received ) refers
to the number of times a patent was cited in
subsequent patents. This measure was described
in our introductory quote as the basis for CHI
research’s investment fund (Barker, 2002). We
used citations to the patent through 1999. Our
sample focuses on the late 1980s and early 1990s
to allow time to calculate citations for patents
studied. In general, the more citations a patent
receives, the greater the economic value (Harhoff
et al., 1999; Narin, Carpenter, and Woolf, 1984;
Trajtenberg, 1990). Cites received is a count of the
number of citations received by the most heavily
cited patent over the 3-year period. In other words,
it measures the strength of a firm’s best patent.
This variable is adjusted by the average citations
for a patent in that technology subfield. NBER
scholars have classified patents into 36 technology
subfields and we use their classification here (Hall
et al., 2001). In this way, we control for patents in
technologies where the citation norms may differ.
This is similar to different citation practices in
different academic fields. Cites received was used
to test Hypothesis 2.
From this, we created another variable—number
of breakthrough patents—which identifies the
number of patents a firm applied for that were
ultimately in the top 10 percent most heavily cited
in their technology subfield (#Breakthroughs). This
variable was used to test Hypothesis 3: trading
driven by the number of breakthrough patents. This
variable, based on Ahuja and Lampert (2001) and
calculated from Cites received, allows us to rec-
ognize when firms have multiple breakthroughs
in the same year. We experimented with several
possible cut-off points between 10 percent and
0.5 percent. However, since these were highly cor-
related and the results were not sensitive to the
cut-off point, we only present the 10 percent cut-
off point here. The two variables Cites received
and #Breakthroughs were never included in the
same model because one is used to calculate the
other.
We also tested the impact of patent value based
on the number of claims (Claims) made for each
patent (a test of Hypothesis 4). This reflects the
number of distinct uses specified for the innovation
in the patent. It is in a firm’s best interest to fully
specify how the innovation is to be applied so
that they have complete coverage for all of the
applications they intend to exploit. As such, this is
a useful proxy for how many applications a given
innovation may have. Like Cites received, the
average claims made for the patent’s technology
subcategory was subtracted to account for different
norms for claims by type of technology.
Finally, we explored the extent that trading was
driven by the speed with which follow-on work
was under way using the lag before a patent
was cited (Cite lag). This variable, used to test
Hypothesis 5, reflects the citation lag (in years) for
the firm’s strongest patent. The general idea is that
managers may have less foresight about patents
when there is a long lag before subsequent work
recognizes the initial patent.
Control variables
Five control variables were drawn from the Cen-
ter for Research on Securities Prices (CRSP),
Thompson Financial’s Insider Trading database,
and COMPUSTAT. First, we control for shares
that insiders held and sold during the time periods.
Insider holdings (Holdings) are important because
they suggest how much stock the insiders already
have in their portfolio. In general, when managers
have large holdings, one would not expect them to
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purchase much additional stock on the open mar-
ket. In that context, they might prefer to diversify
their holdings into other investments. If a man-
ager already has very significant holdings, he or
she may be less prone to buying additional shares
in response to positive events or private knowl-
edge.8 Similarly, a stock purchase may be espe-
cially meaningful if managers already have strong
holdings. This variable was normalized by the total
shares outstanding to account for very large firms
where managers may hold a very small portion of
the shares. This is also log-transformed because of
the skewed nature of the variable’s distribution.
Similarly, shares sold (Shares sold ) indicates
how many shares insiders sold during each period.
Managers sell shares far more often than they ini-
tiate open market purchases. This is, in large part,
due to firms’ tendencies to provide stock-based
compensation. If managers wish to use their com-
pensation for personal consumption, they must sell
shares. This may not always reflect a strong nega-
tive signal to the marketplace since the sales may
have little to do with the firm’s prospects. How-
ever, open market purchases are almost certainly
strong positive signals about the firm. Clearly, if
managers are selling stock during a given period,
this would suggest that they see less need to buy
more stock. By controlling for this, we keep the
focus on open market purchases, which have great
meaning for investors, but, algebraically, this is
similar to using net purchases as the dependent
variable.
Two control variables—Spread and the Market-
to-book ratio —indicate when there may especially
be opportunities to profit from movement in the
stock price. The spread serves as a proxy for stock
volatility and refers to the gap between the highest
and lowest prices that the stock reached in the year
(Spread ). Other things being equal, the larger the
spread, the greater is the opportunity to profit from
the stock. We therefore anticipate a positive rela-
tionship between the spread and insider stock pur-
chases. The market-to-book ratio (Market to book )
has been used as a proxy for Tobin’s q, which
is intended to measure how well the firm’s assets
are deployed. A high value might indicate that the
market has valued important intangible assets not
8 This suggests the possibility that holdings might interact with
our other measures as opposed to having a main effect. We
did test this possibility and found no significant interactions.
However, as we present below, this control variable had a very
strong main effect in predicting stock purchases.
reflected in the book value. As such, we antici-
pate that a high value might mean that information
about imminent breakthroughs is already incorpo-
rated in the stock price and there are fewer oppor-
tunities to profit from additional upward move-
ment. In other words, a higher market-to-book
ratio might be associated with fewer insider stock
purchases because it implies that some of the
information about patent quantity and quality has
already been leaked to the market. On the other
hand, a high market-to-book ratio may indicate that
both managers and investors are optimistic about
the firm’s prospects—suggesting enhanced insider
purchases.
We also controlled for the natural logarithm of
the firm’s revenue (Sales) to reflect firm size. Big
companies have larger top management teams and
higher compensation. Therefore, we would antic-
ipate that the amount of insider purchases for the
top management team would be greater for large
firms. We also initially included a number of other
financial controls from COMPUSTAT (change in
sales, assets, operating income, etc.). However,
the variance explained by these was absorbed
by the controls that directly measured movement
in the stock price itself. Ultimately, since these
accounting-based measures did not substantively
affect our results, they are not shown here.
Analysis
While these data span several years, each model
included only one observation per firm. That is,
we constructed time periods around the filing of
each firm’s top patent. We then examined how
that patent activity affected trading before the
application was filed, in the year it was filed, and
after it had been pending for some time. Since this
was not panel data, analyses were conducted with
lagged variables but time series data analysis was
not required.
As a robustness check, we conducted an anal-
ysis based on patent activity in each of the three
calendar years studied (1988–90). Specifically, we
examined a firm’s portfolio of patents in a given
year, based on the number of patents, the number
of highly cited patents, and the number of claims
made with each patent. This has the advantage of
allowing for multiple observations per firm and
increasing the statistical power. However, this is
not ideal because the patent activity is not aligned
with the time periods. For example, the firm’s top
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patent in a given year might be filed in January
or December—up to 12 months apart. Since we
are interested in when managers act on their fore-
sight, this added imprecision in the timing of the
event might create considerable noise. Neverthe-
less, this analysis yielded comparable results in
both fixed and random effects time series models.
Despite this, we concluded that it was more impor-
tant to use carefully aligned time periods based on
the firms’ top patents in order to draw inferences
about the timing of managerial foresight (Hypoth-
esis 6).
RESULTS
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the sam-
ple. Our dependent variable, the value of shares
purchased (Stock purchases), is significantly cor-
related with all of the other variables. It is most
strongly correlated with Shares sold (0.32), Spread
(0.36), and Sales (0.27). These carry the signs we
had anticipated earlier. For example, the greater
the Spread between the high and low prices in
the year, the greater the opportunity to profit may
be and the more shares we would expect man-
agers to purchase. In addition to this, as we have
suggested, all of the variables summarizing patent
activity are positively correlated with the shares
purchased except Cite lag, which is hypothesized
to have a negative effect.
There are also significant correlations among
other variables. The patent variables have corre-
lations ranging from −0.16 to 0.58. For example,
the number of citations the best patent received
(Cites received ) and the number of breakthrough
patents (#Breakthroughs) have a significant cor-
relation of 0.47. This is not surprising since the
variable #Breakthroughs has been created from
the number of citations received. Cites received is
also significantly correlated with #Patents (0.53).
Presumably, an increase in the number of patents
should be related to an increase in highly cited
patents as well.
Collinearity among these variables is not antic-
ipated to be a problem because the highest corre-
lated variables in the same model—Cites received
and #Patents— are correlated at 0.53. The other
correlations, while significant, are not so strong as
to raise concerns about multicollinearity. Further-
more, the highest variance inflation factor was 2.4
and the average inflation factor was 1.33. Chatter-
jee and Price (1991) suggest that multicollinearity
is problematic when the highest variance inflation
factor exceeds 10 and/or the average variance infla-
tion factor is considerably larger than 1.
Timing of foresight
Table 2 presents results of our regression analy-
sis with insider purchases as the dependent vari-
able and measures of patent quantity and quality
as independent variables of interest. The differ-
ent models test the timing of managerial foresight
suggested in Hypothesis 6. We present two mod-
els in each time period because #Breakthroughs is
closely related to #Patents and Cites received and
they should not be presented in the same model.
While they are conceptually distinct and the corre-
lations are not unreasonably high, #Breakthroughs
is a subset of the #Patents in that both are count
variables based on patent activity. Similarly, while
Cites received is the citations of the most highly
cited patent, #Breakthroughs is a count only of the
most highly cited patents. Thus, Models A and B
test whether managers purchase shares based on
patents to be applied for in the following year
(Hypothesis 6a). Models C and D test whether
managers purchase shares based on patents applied
for in the current year (Hypothesis 6b). Finally
Models E and F test whether managers purchase
shares based on patents that were applied for in the
previous year (Hypothesis 6c). In this way, each
hypothesis about the nature of foresight is tested
for each time period in which foresight might
occur.
All of the models are significant, with F -
statistics between 20.85 and 77.40 (p < 0.001).
Most of the control variables are significant in the
anticipated directions. For example, Shares sold is
negatively associated with insider purchases, while
the Spread and Sales are linked to more insider
purchasing.
Nearly all of the independent variables (Claims,
Cites received, Cite lag, #Breakthroughs) are sig-
nificantly related to insider purchases in the year
prior to patent filing in the predicted directions
(Models A and B). Thus, four out of five tests
provide support for Hypothesis 6a. The fifth vari-
able, #Patents, was significant in the middle period
(Model D), suggesting that managers trade on the
number of patents later and specific individual
breakthroughs earlier. This is the only evidence
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Table 2. Regressions predicting insider stock purchases
Variables Purchases before patents




filed (t + 1)
A B C D E F
#Breakthroughs Cites /#Patents #Breakthroughs Cites /#Patents #Breakthroughs Cites /#Patents
#Breakthroughs 0.07∗∗ 0.05 0.02
(0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
#Patents −0.20 0.78∗∗ 0.23
(0.25) (0.30) (0.371)
Cites received 0.02∗∗ −0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Claims 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ −0.02 −0.02 0.02† 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Cite lag −0.24∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ 0.15 0.15 0.08 0.09
(0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Controls
Shares sold −0.07∗ −0.07∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Holdings 0.14∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.13∗ 0.15∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Spread 0.96∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10)
Market to book 13.10 13.30 0.75∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.17∗ 0.16∗
(8.50) (8.55) (0.19) (0.19) (0.08) (0.08)
Sales 0.73∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
N 1269 1269 1255 1255 1204 1204
F 77.40∗∗∗ 57.11∗∗∗ 28.17∗∗∗ 26.45∗∗∗ 23.92∗∗∗ 20.85∗∗∗
R2 0.24 0.25 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16
a Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance tests are one-sided for hypothesized effects.
†p < 0.1; ∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
in support of Hypothesis 6b. Claims is marginally
significant in the year after patents are filed (Model
E) but the effect is stronger in the earlier period
(Model B). In sum, while there is some weak sup-
port for Hypotheses 6b and 6c, the strongest and
most consistent support is for Hypothesis 6a, that
managers have relatively strong foresight and trade
on breakthroughs before they have even applied for
the patents. This is not surprising since the infor-
mation asymmetry between investors and man-
agers should be greatest when assembling a patent
application. This is the point at which knowledge
is often first codified and the implications become
apparent to managers but the information is still
unavailable to investors.
Patent quantity and quality
Given that managers appear to act on their fore-
sight in the year before applying for a patent
(Models A and B), the other hypotheses focus
on the extent and nature of this foresight. Mod-
els A and B test the five indicators of patent
quality (e.g., #Breakthroughs, Claims, Cite lag,
#Patents, and Cites received ) before applying for
a patent (−6 months to −18 months). Interest-
ingly all were significant in the predicted directions
except #Patents. Thus, insider purchases increase
with the number of citations received, the claims
made, and the number of breakthroughs. Accord-
ingly Hypotheses 2–4 are supported. In addition,
insider purchases decrease when there is a longer
lag before citations appear (Cite lag), suggest-
ing support for Hypothesis 5. While all of these
are significant, the support is perhaps strongest
(p < 0.001) for Hypothesis 5, which suggests that
insider purchases are driven by follow-on work
under way to develop innovations that build on
the patent (Cite lag). Again, managers seem to
anticipate innovations well before the patents are
applied for but this foresight may be augmented
by the extent of related work in progress.
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#Patents was significant only in the year that
patents were applied for, providing support for
a relatively weaker level of managerial foresight.
That is, where managers can identify a major inno-
vation, they trade on that knowledge well before
a patent has even been applied for. However, with
smaller innovations, they are likely to trade as
patent applications are assembled and filed. Recall-
ing that Hypothesis 1 tests for lower levels of
foresight and was motivated by arguments, such as
real options that imply great uncertainty, it is not
surprising that this is supported in a later period.
Thus, it appears that managers are able to distin-
guish between minor patents and those that form
the bases for a great deal of follow-on work. How-
ever, to some extent they also appear to be apply-
ing a real options approach—basing trades on the
number of R&D options the firm holds rather than
which ones hold the most promise.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Most of the theory building and empirical effort in
the strategic management literature has focused on
factors that might lead to a competitive advantage.
However, the existing literature has not explored
the extent of managerial foresight associated with
these theories or ways in which managers may
exploit their foresight for personal gain. Further-
more, the broader question of who will reap the
gains from a competitive advantage is relatively
unexplored (Barney, 2001). This study identifies
managerial foresight as a critical element of the
resource-based view, and explores its extent and
impact.
Our results suggest that managers do anticipate
breakthrough innovations and trade on that infor-
mation before patent applications have been filed.
Moreover, this trading activity is more sensitive to
the quality of the most promising patents than to
the volume of patenting activity. Thus, it would
appear that trading patterns reflect an attempt to
anticipate which patents will confer an advantage
to the firm.
Is insider trading equivalent to rent
appropriation?
We have not measured the extent to which man-
agers enhanced their wealth directly in this study.
It is therefore reasonable to ask how insider pur-
chasing is related to rent appropriation. Our evi-
dence suggests that managers are trading based
on accurate information much of the time (e.g.,
they appear to identify breakthroughs ex ante).
While we do not test it here, there is ample evi-
dence that investors respond favorably to open
market purchases by insiders (Damodaran and Liu,
1993; Seyhun, 1992). This effect is even stronger
in R&D-intensive settings (Coff and Lee, 2003).
Managers may sell their shares shortly after mar-
kets have adjusted upward to reflect the informa-
tion conveyed by their purchases. Alternatively,
they may wait until the innovation is widely under-
stood and fully reflected in the firm’s share price.
While we do not measure exactly when managers
divest, they would profit in either case, assuming
their private information is accurate—something
that seems reasonably evident from our analysis.
Thus, such trading might be considered as a
form of pre-emptive rent appropriation. This obser-
vation raises a number of questions that warrant
further inquiry and discussion. First, does this type
of insider trading hurt investors? Second, what are
other implications of the information asymmetries
embedded in the resource-based view? Third, how
and when is rent from a competitive advantage
appropriated? Finally, what are the implications
for identifying and measuring competitive advan-
tages? We explore these questions below.
Are shareholders injured?
Given that insider trading may be a form of rent
appropriation, it is natural to ask from whom
insiders are appropriating the rent. Let us sup-
pose that a firm’s stock is trading at a price
of P0 when managers purchase shares based on
knowledge of an imminent breakthrough. The pub-
lic announcement and commercialization of the
breakthrough may be years away, but managers
are confident from initial indications. We assume
that the share price will increase to P2 when the
full extent of the breakthrough becomes publicly
known. Upon announcement of managers’ trades,
other investors purchase shares—driving up the
price to P1, where P0 < P1 < P2, since detailed
information about the breakthrough remains undis-
closed. Eventually, the firm announces details of
the breakthrough—pushing the price from P1 to
P2. Thus, managerial trading releases information
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(e.g., that managers are confident) earlier than
would have otherwise been the case.
Those who owned a stake before the insider
purchases benefit as their shares increase in value
sooner than would have otherwise been the case.
Investors who buy after management has traded
realize lower gains than if management had not
traded. They do not benefit when the stock price
moves from P0 to P1 since they did not initially
hold shares. If such investors would have bought
even without observing insider’s purchases, this
is a loss attributable to the insider trading. In
contrast, if they were attracted by management’s
signal of confidence, they would not have received
any gains (e.g., they receive P2 − P1 by following
management’s lead).
A relatively small number of investors might
be worse off for unknowingly selling shares to
insiders and missing out on gains from selling
later. However, this group of investors would have
given up voting rights by selling shares and many
of them may no longer hold shares at all. Thus,
continuing shareholders would have little incentive
to curtail insider trading.
Accordingly, such rent appropriation may not
be deleterious for most shareholders. Most share-
holders benefit from the signals provided through
insider trading as some reap gains sooner, while
others gain by following management’s lead. In
addition, shareholders may benefit if managers
guard strategic information so it doesn’t fall into
rivals’ hands. We believe that this somewhat con-
troversial issue warrants further theory develop-
ment and empirical study.
Competitive advantage and information
asymmetries
The resource-based view focuses on unique re-
sources under the firms’ control that confer a
sustainable advantage (Barney, 1991). However,
the factors that keep strategic resources from rivals
suggest that, more often than not, the key resources
will be knowledge-based. Indeed, a dependence
on tacit knowledge may keep the advantage from
being imitated or acquired by competing firms
(Reed and DeFillippi, 1990).
This suggests that information asymmetries are
fundamental to the resource-based view. Re-
searchers have been most interested in the end
product—resource asymmetries across firms that
generate performance differences. However, to
sustain these differentials, information asymme-
tries must persist and keep strategic resources from
rivals. As a result, information asymmetries prolif-
erate within the firm, especially between managers
and shareholders.
Agency theory has focused largely on how
individuals might take advantage of information
asymmetries. This article has presented one way
in which managers might use their information
advantage to profit personally. In so doing, we
have linked the strategic importance of knowl-
edge creation with problems addressed in the
agency theory literature. These literatures have
been largely separate and the agency problems cre-
ated by such assets have not been fully addressed
in the strategy literature. Indeed, the focus has been
almost entirely on the strategic benefits that firms
(and stockholders) may gain through knowledge
creation rather than opportunism-based dilemmas
that may result (Barney, 1991; Conner and Praha-
lad, 1996).
This study explores whether managers are able
to take advantage of these information asymme-
tries. As discussed above, this may not represent
a conflict of interests with shareholders. How-
ever, it raises a whole spectrum of agency-oriented
problems that may be embedded in the resource-
based view. Indeed, the real question is whether
there are other more subtle ways that stakeholders
can take advantage of these information asym-
metries. The attributes of knowledge-based assets
may also pave the way for a variety of agency
problems that are unrelated to capital markets
(motivation, hiring, etc.). Clearly, proponents of
the knowledge-based theory of the firm should
consider the dilemmas that knowledge-based assets
pose along with their benefits. Further research
should explicitly link knowledge-based assets to
the threat of opportunism and explore how man-
agers might use their information advantages to
advance their own interests.
Measuring rent generation
A second domain of inquiry strikes at the core
question in the strategic management literature:
why do some firms outperform others (Rumelt
et al., 1991). To address this, we must have an
understanding of how to measure rent that is gen-
erated, independent of which stakeholders in the
firm might appropriate the rent. For example, man-
agers may appropriate rent in a variety of ways
Copyright  2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 26: 791–808 (2005)
Managerial Foresight and Rent Appropriation 807
including unusually high compensation (e.g., in
excess of the minimum amount required to hold
them in place). Our results suggest that managers
may appropriate rent in the form of insider trades.
Accounting-based performance measures necessar-
ily treat payments to managers as expenses and
exclude any rent they may appropriate from mea-
sures of profitability (Coff, 1999). To the extent
that market-based performance measures respond
to accounting performance, these may also exclude
rent appropriated by insiders.
These issues are particularly pertinent when cor-
porate governance structures are under review and
changing. With the fall of prominent firms such as
Enron and WorldCom, corporate governance and
rent appropriation issues have taken center stage
among institutional investors, the SEC, and the U.S
government. It is important to point out that our
results do not suggest further governmental inter-
vention with regard to insider trading. Rather, our
study merely hints at the myriad of research ques-
tions that have yet to be answered.
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